Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (14)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Krehbiel, K.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

© 1996 Oxford University Press

Committee Power, Leadership, and the Median Voter: Evidence from the Smoking Ban

Keith Krehbiel

Stanford University

In an intricate sequence of legislative decisions rich with implications for theories of collective choice, the U. S. House of Representatives in 1987 initiated a smoking ban on all domestic airline flights. Two previous studies—by LaRue and Rothenberg in 1992 and Shipan in 1995—analyzed and interpreted the case as supportive of institutional or committee-power theories. This study reanalyzes the case to assess specific instances of committee-power, leadership, and median-voter theories Overall, the findings undermine LaRue and Rothenberg‘s support for gatekeeping-based committee power; they replicate and extend Shipan’s refutation of the hypothesis that majority-party leaders are enforcers of pro-committee institutional arrangements; and they corroborate a variation of median-voter theory. The bulk of evidence is consistent with an unconventionally nonpartisan claim: that the House (analytically, its median voter) chooses and uses procedural arrangements such as its Rules Committee to limit the effective exercise of committee and leadership powers.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 J Public Adm Res TheoryHome page
D.-R. Kim
Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A Multi-Institutional Analysis of OSHA Enforcement
J. Public Adm. Res. Theory., January 1, 2008; 18(1): 33 - 55.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 American Politics ResearchHome page
H. Brasher
Listening to Hearings: Legislative Hearings and Legislative Outcomes
American Politics Research, September 1, 2006; 34(5): 583 - 604.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
G. A. Caldeira and C. Zorn
Strategic Timing, Position-Taking, and Impeachment in the House of Representatives
Political Research Quarterly, December 1, 2004; 57(4): 517 - 527.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
S. W. Yackee
Punctuating the Congressional Agenda: Strategic Scheduling by House and Senate Leaders
Political Research Quarterly, June 1, 2003; 56(2): 139 - 149.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.