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© 1997 Oxford University Press
An Informational Theory of the Legislative Veto
A formal model is analyzed in which a legislature considers giving up some or all of its policy-making authority in order to benefit from the executive's potentially superior information Delegation may occur while legislators care about the impact of policy, are able to set policy on their own, and may include a procedural constrainta legislative vetowhen they delegate. Congress's continued use of legislative-veto procedures demonstrates the need for a model of delegation including delegation with a procedural constraint.
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