Skip Navigation

This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in ISI Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Search for citing articles in:
ISI Web of Science (33)
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Tiller, E.
Right arrow Articles by Spiller, P.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization V15 I2
© 1999 Oxford University Press

Article

Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law

EH Tiller0 and PT Spiller1

0 University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX, USA
1 University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA

Abstract

This article presents models of strategic behavior by agencies and courts where the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy choices from higher level review. The theory is based on the notion that decision instruments (for example, rulemaking and adjudication for agencies, statutory interpretation and reasoning process review for courts) pose differential costs and payoffs for both the initiating and reviewing actors, each of whom have resource constraints. Because the initiating actor has the choice among instruments to make a decision (and to which a higher level reviewing actor is tied), the initiating actor can manipulate decision costs in a strategic fashion (choosing high-cost instruments to discourage higher level review, in particular). This article adds new insight into how judges and agencies engage in strategic decision making.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 American Politics ResearchHome page
C. M. King
Strategic Selection of Legal Instruments on the U.S. Supreme Court
American Politics Research, September 1, 2007; 35(5): 621 - 642.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 J Law Econ OrganHome page
T. Jacobi and E. H. Tiller
Legal Doctrine and Political Control
J. Law Econ. Organ., June 1, 2007; 23(2): 326 - 345.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 J Law Econ OrganHome page
J. R. Rogers and G. Vanberg
Resurrecting Lochner: A Defense of Unprincipled Judicial Activism
J. Law Econ. Organ., June 1, 2007; 23(2): 442 - 468.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 J Law Econ OrganHome page
M. M. Schanzenbach and E. H. Tiller
Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence
J. Law Econ. Organ., April 1, 2007; 23(1): 24 - 56.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
A. B. Whitford
Decentralized Policy Implementation
Political Research Quarterly, March 1, 2007; 60(1): 17 - 30.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 J Law Econ OrganHome page
J. M. de Figueiredo
Strategic Plaintiffs and Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation
J. Law Econ. Organ., October 1, 2005; 21(2): 501 - 523.
[Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Home page
 Political Research QuarterlyHome page
L. Epstein and J. Knight
Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead
Political Research Quarterly, September 1, 2000; 53(3): 625 - 661.
[Abstract] [PDF]


Disclaimer: Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.