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The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization V18 I1
© 2002 Oxford University Press

Original Article

Delegating Power to Bureaucracies: Evidence from the States

Craig Volden

Claremont Graduate University and University of Michigan

Abstract

Empirical analysis has lagged behind theoretical advancement in the study of legislative delegation of power to bureaucracies. This article analyzes why state legislatures delegated advisory and policy-forming powers to bureaucracies for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program from 1935 through 1996. The analysis supports various theories of bureaucratic discretion, while painting a complex political picture of delegation decisions. Legislators rely on bureaucrats to resolve uncertainty, especially when internal legislative information is scarce. Contrary to recent wisdom, however, delegation is not found to be associated with the general condition of unified government. Rather, delegation occurs under both divided and unified government, but the procedures chosen and appointment powers granted vary under these two conditions.


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