The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization V19 I2
© 2003 Oxford University Press
Regulating Slavery: Deck-Stacking and Credible Commitment in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
State University of New YorkStony Brook
Abstract
In 1850, Congress delegated federal judicial powers to a new bureaucracy that was devoted to capturing escaped slaves in free states and returning them to their owners. The Fugitive Slave Act was an attempt to enhance the credibility of a commitment made in the Constitution's Article IV
2, which had gone unenforced for more than half a century. This article demonstrates how Congress engaged in deck-stacking, engineering the administrative structure and judicial procedures of the fugitive slave rendition process in ways that favored slave-holding interests. Analysis of votes by members of Congress on final passage of the act and amendments to the act demonstrate the political influences on choices of process. I demonstrate that regional (free versus slave state), partisan (Whig versus Democrat), and electoral (Free Soil party support) calculations all play a role in determining the likelihood of a legislator voting for the antislavery position. Moreover, political conflict was muted when amendments dealt mainly with structural issues, but was amplified when the amendment's content was procedural.