Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access originally published online on November 2, 2005
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2006 22(1):184-212; doi:10.1093/jleo/ewj002
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Coworker Complementarity and the Stability of Top-Management Teams
University of Utah
Stanford University
University of Utah
scott.schaefer{at}business.utah.edu
We analyze changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the chief executive officer [CEO]) departs. We find that the probability of non-CEO top manager turnover increases markedly around times of CEO turnover. Further, the magnitude of this increase depends on the relations between the tenure of the manager and tenures of the departing and incoming CEOs. Departure of a long-tenured CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a long-tenured non-CEO manager than for a short-tenured manager. Succession of a long-tenured manager as CEO has a larger effect on turnover probability for a short-tenured non-CEO manager than for a long-tenured manager. We argue that these findings are at least partially the result of complementarities across these groups of coworkers that affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms.