Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access originally published online on June 11, 2007
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2007 23(2):499-518; doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm031
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Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation
Columbia University
Dartmouth College
Columbia University
George Washington University
* Columbia University. Email: de11{at}columbia.edu.
** Dartmouth College. Email: Michael.Herron{at}dartmouth.edu.
*** Columbia University. Email: so33{at}columbia.edu.
**** George Washington University. Email: dkp{at}gwu.edu.
This article applies modern Bayesian roll call analysis to estimate legislators' support for minority-favored policies, and to determine the likely impact of competing redistricting plans on the substantive representation of minority interests. We first provide a theory of districting and policy outcomes that points to the importance of coalition building in advancing minority policy concerns and motivates our estimation techniques. We then apply this methodology to the redistricting of the South Carolina State Senate following the 1990 census. We show that this redistricting led to more minorities being elected to office but less substantive representation.