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Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access originally published online on December 6, 2007
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2009 25(1):183-210; doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm047
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Right arrow D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Right arrow D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Right arrow H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
Right arrow I18 - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
Right arrow J08 - Labor Economics Policies
Right arrow J28 - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
Right arrow J88 - Public Policy
Right arrow K00 - General
Right arrow K23 - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
Right arrow K31 - Labor Law
Right arrow K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Right arrow L51 - Economics of Regulation
Right arrow L74 - Construction
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© The Author 2007. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Yale University. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org

Has Devolution Injured American Workers? State and Federal Enforcement of Construction Safety

Alison D. Morantz*

Stanford Law School

* Stanford Law School. Email: amorantz{at}law.stanford.edu.

Although the issue of regulatory devolution has received much scholarly scrutiny, rigorous empirical studies of its effects on important policy outcomes are scarce. This article explores the effects of partial regulatory devolution in the occupational safety arena by exploiting a unique historical anomaly whereby some US states enforce protective labor regulations that are enforced elsewhere by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Analyzing data from the construction industry, this article contains several important findings. First, state inspectors use traditional enforcement tools more sparingly than their federal counterparts, typically citing fewer violations and collecting lower fines per violation. Second, although federal enforcement significantly lowers the estimated frequency of nonfatal construction injuries, it also predicts a significant increase in occupational fatalities. I suggest that although higher underreporting of nonfatal injuries in federally regulated states could explain this puzzling finding, it is equally possible that different regulatory styles have different "comparative advantages" in deterring nonfatal injuries on one hand and occupational fatalities on the other. (JEL D73, D78, H73, I18, J08, J28, J88, K00, K23, K31, K32, L51, and L74)


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