Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access originally published online on November 25, 2008
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 2009 25(2):400-441; doi:10.1093/jleo/ewn022
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Uncertainty, Pay for Performance, and Asymmetric Information
Universidad de Chile
* Centro de Economía Aplicada, Departamento de Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de Chile, República 701, Santiago 6521122, Chile. E-mail: fbalmace{at}dii.uchile.cl.
This article develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts where the labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse, and firms are risk neutral and unaware of workers' productivities. The article shows that the prevalence of pay for performance rises and the pay-for-performance sensitivity falls as environmental uncertainty increases. This empirical regularity is unaccounted for alternative models such as the standard agency model. (JEL D86, L2, M5, J3)