Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access published online on April 7, 2009
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewp006
Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets
University of Chicago and National Bureau of Economic Research
Cornell University
* Dennis W. Carlton, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637-1610 and National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138. Email: dennis.carlton{at}chicagobooth.edu.
** Michael Waldman, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 323 Sage Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853. NY 14853. Email: mw46{at}cornell.edu.
Consider a durable goods producer that has the option of monopolizing an aftermarket such as repair for its own product. An important question is whether such monopolization reduces welfare? We show that the answer to this question is frequently no. In particular, we explore three models that illustrate various ways in which aftermarket monopolization can reduce inefficiencies and thus increase social welfare and frequently also consumer welfare. Our article shows that efficiency enhancing aftermarket monopolization may be much more common than previous literature suggests. (JEL K21, L12, L49)