Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access published online on June 26, 2009
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, doi:10.1093/jleo/ewp016
Legislative Pivots, Presidential Powers, and Policy Stability
Washington University, St. Louis
University of California, San Diego
University of Pittsburgh
* Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, St. Louis, MO, USA. Email: crisp{at}wustl.edu
** Department of Political Science, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA. Email: swd{at}ucsd.edu
*** Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. Email: kanthak{at}pitt.edu.
We offer a general model of policy making across presidential systems, exploring how checks and balances interact with legislative party systems to determine the responsiveness of political systems to electoral change. Using the two dominant theories of policy making in the United States as a starting point, we formally model the legislative process across presidential regimes characterized by a wide array of institutional designs, simulate expected policy behavior, and then test our models empirically with data capturing economic policy choices. (JEL D72, D71, H11, C63)