Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Articles

John Ferejohn and Charles Shipan

Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 1-20; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.1 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Susan Rose-Ackerman

Comment on Ferejohn and Shipan's "Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy"
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 21-27; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.21 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Matthew L. Spitzer

Extensions of Ferejohn and Shipan's Model of Administrative Agency Behavior
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 29-43; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.29 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Nalebuff

The Commitment to Seniority in Self-Governing Groups
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 45-72; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.45 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Keith Krehbiel

Seniority, Commitment, and Self-Governing Groups
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 73-77; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.73 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Robert P. Inman and Michael A. Fitts

Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 79-132; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.79 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Mathew D. McCubbins

Note: Budget Policy-making and the Appearance of Power
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 133-153; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.133 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

William P. Rogerson

Comment on "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence From The U.S. Historical Record"
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 155-166; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.155 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Michael E. Levine and Jennifer L. Forrence

Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 167-198; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.167 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Robert A. Katzmann

Comments on Levine and Forrence, "Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis"
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 199-202; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.199 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

McNollgast

Slack, Public Interest, and Structure-Induced Policy
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 203-212; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.203 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Terry M. Moe

Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 213-253; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.213 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Morris P. Fiorina

Comment: The Problems with PPT
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 255-261; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.255 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Oliver E. Williamson

Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story—Comment
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 263-266; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.263 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Jerry L. Mashaw

Explaining Administrative Process: Normative, Positive, and Critical Stories of Legal Development
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 267-298; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.267 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Cass R. Sunstein

Political Economy, Administrative Law: A Comment
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 299-306; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.299 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

McNollgast

Positive and Normative Models of Procedural Rights: An Integrative Approach to Administrative Procedures
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: 307-332; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.307 [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

Editorial

Editors' Note
J Law Econ Organ 1990 6: i; doi:10.1093/jleo/6.special_issue.i [PDF] [Request Permissions]  

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